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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay addresses the conditions under which reactive and pre-emptive
military intervention are ethical, and whether adjustments can and should be
made in international law and institutions to establish the parameters of their
legality and to ensure that they are authorized by legitimate authority. Both
types of intervention can be multilateral or unilateral, and each needs to be
addressed in relation to the three major issues on the contemporary agenda:
mass killing within the borders of a state, international terrorism, and the illegal
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The essay also re-examines
the balance of authority and action among states, regional organizations, and the
United Nations (U.N.) in matters of military intervention and suggests how to
clarify their respective roles and responsibilities.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
This essay recommends that the Secretary Council and General Assembly
endorse the following principles and rules and take appropriate action to give
them effect.
* United States Foreign Service Officer (ret.); Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University
of Massachusetts Amherst. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2004, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2004.
380 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:379
A. Mass Killing
That reactive multilateral military intervention authorized by a regional
organization, the Security Council, or, failing these, the General Assembly
under the Uniting for Peace procedure, is justified to halt mass killing within a
state when the state itself is the cause of the killing or is unwilling or unable to
stop it.
That pre-emptive multilateral intervention authorized by one of the
foregoing institutions is justified if there is abundant, well-corroborated, clear
and convincing evidence that mass killing is imminent and the state is unwilling
or unable to prevent it.
That reactive unilateral intervention by a state or coalition is justified to
halt mass killing underway in another state, if it is evident that efforts to secure
multilateral intervention or authorization are too slow or ineffective, provided
that post-facto authorization is sought promptly from the proper institution.
B. Intervention Against States and Terrorist Organizations
That reactive intervention, whether multilateral or unilateral, is justified in
cases such as Afghanistan in which a state has sheltered terrorists who have
mounted a series of international attacks.
That pre-emptive action against terrorist organizations is justified on the
authorization of the Security Council or a regional organization, failing the
cooperation of the state where terrorists are located.
That unilateral pre-emption by a state or coalition is justified when there
is abundant, well-corroborated, clear and convincing evidence that an attack by
an international terrorist organization sponsored by a state, or by a state itself,
against one's own territory is imminent and no multilateral institution is willing
and able to prevent it; as an extension of self-defense, pre-emptive action must
be proportionate and aimed solely at frustrating the attack.
That unilateral pre-emptive intervention is justified when necessary, by
means of clear and convincing evidence, to safeguard the lives of one's
nationals in another state and to evacuate them if appropriate.
C. Intervention Against Illegal Nuclear and Other WMD Programs
That pre-emptive military intervention authorized by the Security Council
or the General Assembly (under the Uniting for Peace procedure) is justified to
frustrate or otherwise neutralize the transfer to a terrorist organization of nuclear
weapons, and in many cases will also be justified in the case of chemical and
biological weapons.
That pre-emptive military intervention authorized by the Security Council
is justified as a last resort to neutralize an illegal program by a state to acquire
nuclear weapons.
III. FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES
Physical power simply exists in the world; it is there. One has to deal with
it, not act or think as if it were not present. It is always present. And it is, at
bottom, human power, enhanced by weapons and tools and technology made
and used by humans. It is primarily military power, including control over
communications and intelligence-gathering technology and systems. The other
basic reality one encounters always and everywhere is that human beings want
to live in a world that combines justice and order, at least enough both to
safeguard their lives and limbs and to enable them to work, learn, raise families,
worship and do other ordinary things on a reasonably predictable day-to-day
basis.
Looking at the world from above, as if from a point in space, the scene is
of over 190 individual authority communities-states-each possessing some
quantity of power. The leaders of one state can, if they wish, use their power
against another state, and groups of state leaders can pool their resources to do
the same. Power, and its potential for use at any time, often appears to be the
central reality in interstate relations.'
But even looked at from above, it is clear that the human desire for order
and justice is also part of the picture. This desire is as real as power. To live in
a world ofjustice means living in a world of law, which expresses the practical
meaning of justice in clear terms, and where those who hold power act in
accordance with law. To bring law from paper to life, institutions link power
with law. Today we need to add something to the existing architecture of
institutions and law, and it can be accomplished without amending the Charter.2
IV. MASS KILLING
Massacres occur because a regime or group believes that the world will be
a better place without certain people; they believe that the target group is the
main obstacle to creating a superior society or that it must be wiped out as
1. Physical power is of course not the same thing as influence. Some small states having little
physical power are able to exercise considerable influence in world affairs, that is, to affect the course of
events and the outcome of issues. Examples include Ireland, Costa Rica, Senegal and Ghana. It is important
to keep this in mind even while studying ways to channel and control military power.
2. It is not necessary to amend the Charter to accomplish such purposes. This has been emphasized
by many observers. See, e.g., MiNH-THu D. PHAM, THE UNITED NATIONS FOUND., THE UNITED NATIONS &
THE NEW THREATS: RETHINKING SEC. 12-14 (2004), http://www.un-
globalsecurity.org/pdf/reports/romeconference.rep.pdf.
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punishment for past crimes. Intervention to stop mass killing faced formidable
opposition in the 1960s through the 1980s in such places as Uganda, East
Pakistan, and Cambodia. Most states either kept silent or actually criticized the
intervention, because a fundamental principle of world order was being
breached: borders must not be crossed by military force except in self-defense
or to carry out a U.N. Security Council resolution under Chapter VII. Most
states saw their own survival jeopardized by acceptance of any intervention that
could be used as a precedent against themselves. "Order by borders" was for
them the main guarantee of their own sometimes recently-won independence,
and even for long-established states, the fact that two world wars had broken out
when borders were violated had embedded the view that the inviolability of
frontiers was the best safeguard of peace.
This began to change, fitfully, in the 1990s, as the conscience of human-
kind was newly shocked by the killing of Kurds in northern Iraq following the
first Gulf War and the subsequent slaughters in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Rwanda. In Rwanda, the horrific result of the Security Council's paralysis led
to a strong movement in many countries to search for ways to apply enough
flexibility to the principle of inviolability of state borders to save the lives of the
human beings whose security was the ostensible reason for those very borders
in the first place. People began to reason that the wall of sovereignty must be
strong enough to prevent aggression, but not so rigid as to protect mass
slaughter within it. Just as within a polity there is a need for public authority to
safeguard lives, there is also a need for authority on a broader plane to do this
when domestic authority fails or disappears or turns homicidal.
It is not difficult to argue that the purpose of self-determination, the right
of a people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development" (Article 1 (1) of both International
Covenants on Human Rights), is to enable a people to provide for the security
of their lives and to achieve, progressively, the multidimensional fullness of life
through their own laws, policies and institutions.3 Going further, one could
argue that self-determination has rational limits, specified first by its intrinsic
purposes and second by the principle of subsidiarity. If a government itself
becomes murderous or if it simply cannot provide a minimum of personal
security, it fails to achieve the first purpose of self-determination. In this situa-
tion, larger entities of which this state is a part as a member of the international
community, can and should come to the people's rescue. Intervention should
be limited to situations in which lives are actually being taken on a large scale
or there is clear and convincing evidence that such killing is about to com-
mence.
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, § 1 993
U.N.T.S. 5; International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, § 1 999 U.N.T.S. 173.
The issue has been cogently presented by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty in its report, "The Responsibility to Pro-
tect."4 Released in December 2001, this is a document that merits close atten-
tion by the United Nations. The Commission rightly affirms the existence of a
responsibility to protect human life even in the face of the important norm of
nonintervention, and that appropriate action to carry out this responsibility
should be recognized as legal.
This paper stands in agreement with the first "just cause" criterion for mili-
tary intervention proposed by the Commission, namely "large scale loss of life,
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either
of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state
situation."5 However, the second proposed criterion is problematic: "large
scale 'ethnic cleansing,' actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.",6 The latter amounts to authorizing the
use of lethal force against acts for which police, in most countries, are not
authorized to use lethal force. The phrase "carried out by killing" is already
included in the first criterion, so it is the other elements we must evaluate:
evictions and rape, both of which are terrible crimes but not, in the view of this
writer, justifiable grounds for summarily killing the perpetrators, and vague
"acts of terror."
Intervening forces arrive with weapons and the authority to use them to
kill, if necessary, in order to stop the practices that led them to intervene. If rape
and illegitimate eviction are made bases for military intervention, they would
become in effect capital crimes under international law, punishable summarily
by death at the hands of intervening forces. This seems excessive, unwise and
unnecessary. The International Criminal Court can prosecute and try rapists and
those responsible for expelling people, or national courts can try them under
applicable extradite-or-prosecute provisions of international law.
Further over-stretching the limits of a rational responsibility to protect, the
Commission asserts that "situations of state collapse" and "overwhelming
natural or environmental catastrophes" are to be included in the two just-cause
criteria as "conscience-shocking situations" justifying military intervention.7
This merely creates pretexts for intervention. It would lead to a fundamental
weakening of the principles of international order, in a way that accepting inter-
vention only to halt large-scale killing would not. In a later passage, the Com-
mission perhaps recognizes that: "[i]t is a real question ... where lies the most
4. Ti INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 32 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 33.
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harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed
or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the
Security Council stands by."8 Only human life is mentioned here. This is the
right standard.
Moreover, the Commission endorses pre-emption, but unambiguously
limits it to lifesaving situations:
Military action can be legitimate as an anticipatory measure in
response to clear evidence of likely large-scale killing of civilians or
other noncombatants. Without this possibility of anticipatory action,
the international community would be placed in the morally unten-
able position of being required to wait until genocide begins, before
being able to take action to stop it.9
As the Commission elsewhere makes clear that in its view intervention
must be authorized by the United Nations or an established regional or sub-
regional organization, it follows that its endorsement of anticipatory action does
not encompass unilateral pre-emption.
The reference to "clear evidence" takes us to the question of imminence
and with it, to the reliability of intelligence. Here the Commission steps back
a bit and acknowledges that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any institutional
solution to the problem of evidence, of a kind that would put the satisfaction of
the 'just cause' criterion absolutely beyond doubt or argument in every case.
Despite the straw-man second clause, the recognition of a problem with evi-
dence is a bright yellow light, a powerful argument for great caution in
following the Commission's call to take "anticipatory action." If the standard
of evidence were set at abundant, well-corroborated, clear, and convincing, this
would at a minimum require information from multiple reliable sources, point-
ing unambiguously at the same conclusion. While there can never be 100
percent certainty or comprehensive knowledge about a developing situation, a
responsibility to protect must be exercised by decision-makers within a
framework of substantiated fact and professional analysis. There is no sub-
stitute for this.
V. POWER AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
To imagine what it would take to structure a world where power would be
used only to serve justice requires following two distinct but interdependent
lines of thought. The first would seek to articulate, in terms as close as possible
8. Id. at 55.
9. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 5, at 33.
10. Id. at 35.
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to a universal consensus, what justice means within and among political
societies, and for this we do not need to start from scratch. We already have
principles and norms that enjoy universal or near-universal acceptance. We find
them in the U.N. Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the two Covenants on Human Rights, and other landmark
documents adopted by the international community either as treaties or as
standards of conduct. Two relevant examples of the latter are the Declaration
on the Elimination of Religious Discrimination and Intolerance and the Declara-
tion on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities.
The second path invites us to design structures within which power can be
used in clearly bounded channels. Absent such channels, we are left with a
situation in which those who actually have power can use it as they wish unless
constrained by other power-holders, i.e., the world before 1945. To succeed,
these structures must represent an aggregation of strength that can come only
from the shared recognition by the powerful of a common interest in ensuring
that the use of power must be managed within a particular set of rules and
structures. The League of Nations demonstrated that commitments on paper are
not sufficient for this purpose, and the U.N. was designed to remedy that defect.
The U.N. can now make improvements in the design.
Some have argued that it is crucial to invest the U.N. with standing armed
forces to enable the Security Council to deal swiftly and decisively with mass
killing and other threats to peace and security. The current practice of building
every U.N. force from scratch, from voluntary ad hoc contributions, would give
way to a speed and regularity of application of appropriate force when and
where needed. Some massacres and even wars could probably be deterred,
others halted just after their outbreak." In time, the existence of an effective
standing multilateral armed force might allow some states to reduce their own
military establishments and rely for their security on the international force, a
huge saving that would permit unprecedented progress toward development.
Establishment of such a force in the near term would require a political will
that does not yet exist among the members of the Security Council, although it
might be possible to agree on steps to implement or expand the pre-positioning
of specialized logistical and communications staffs, facilities and supplies, to
further strengthen U.N. headquarters monitoring and early-warning capabilities,
and to broaden participation in standby forces. It might even be possible to
infuse life into the Charter provisions for a Military Staff Committee. Even
11. Had a standing United Nations force existed in 1994, the Rwanda tragedy could have been
stopped in its first phase. Moreover, on the Iraq issue, it is arguable that a robust standing U.N. force would
have added credibility to the Council's various pre-2003 resolutions, and might have induced Saddam Hussein
to cooperate with the U.N. much earlier than he did, thereby forestalling the U.S.-United Kingdom decision
to take matters into their own hands.
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perennial recommendations that cannot be put into place immediately should be
revisited from time to time, as political will evolves. But the most promising
avenue of near-term progress might lie in a different direction.
Intergovernmental activity takes place at four main levels: directly
between states, and through sub-regional, regional, and global institutions.
These official channels are complemented by transnational nonofficial networks
of labor unions, multinational corporations and banks, human rights organiza-
tions, political federations, and criminal and terrorist organizations. But states
have almost all of the military power and remain the fundamental authority
communities in the system. They and only they can commit themselves and
their resources to specific purposes, including creation of binding laws and law
enforcement structures. Today, their attention and energy are focused increas-
ingly on the regional level.
The wave of nationalism, although still strong, is giving way to region-
alism in most parts of the globe. Regional economic integration and federation
are already well-advanced, but what is new is that states within a region are now
increasingly willing to engage in military cooperation and coordination within
their area. This is another example of subsidiarity in action. One finds within
a region a greater commonality of culture and approach than in a global body.
A view can develop that it is better for "us" to resolve our own problems toget-
her than for "us" to allow them to get worse or to invite the possible interven-
tion of extra-regional powers.' 2
The Security Council could capitalize on the regionalist trend by granting
regional security institutions more decision-making autonomy to deal with
crises as they arise. The evolving Darfur and Congo crises are examples of the
potential usefulness of a regionalist approach, a solution that Africans have
turned to in other recent crises, notably in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Ivory
Coast, Liberia). The actual force can be sub-regional, but should be authorized
(even post-facto) by the African Union. In the Western Hemisphere, the
Organization of African States (OAS) has authorized and managed successful
interventions in several crises of the last two decades.
NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo has demonstrated its ability to
act effectively in humanitarian crises. In Afghanistan, NATOs post-conflict role
demonstrates the utility of further developing its collective security potential
under the U.N. umbrella. The European Union is well on the way to developing
an analogous capability. The Security Council should work with both organiza-
tions to develop clear rules and procedures for future out-of-area involvement.
12. See MARTA DASSU & ROBERTO MENOTrI, ASPEN INSTITUTE-ITALIA, COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO
CRISIS SITUATIONS: THE EU, NATO, AND UN AND MORE EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION (2003-2004),
http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Dassu_papercolelctive-response.pdf.
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In general, the Security Council should encourage the expanding security
role of regional institutions by adopting resolutions interpreting Chapters VII
and VIII in such a way as to establish specific criteria under regional inter-
governmental organizations, designated in advance by the Council, would be
authorized to intervene without advance Council authorization in cases of mass
killing of civilians and noncombatants. 3
The Security Council could draft and approve a set of principles and
procedures for regional action that would include advance authorization for the
pre-designated regional intergovernmental organizations to act at once in
response to an outbreak of large-scale killing (or to clear and convincing evi-
dence that such killing is about to begin) and seek subsequent Council approval
for that action. The language of Articles 47 and 53 of the Charter seem to offer
enough flexibility for this purpose, particularly when taken together with
Articles 33, 34, and 39. This would codify what has largely developed as
accepted practice in recent years, and it would arm the international community
with instruments that could be activated quickly to save lives, as an alternative
to unilateral or coalitional action. The advance authorization would commit the
regional institutions to certain obligations to the Council in the areas of
reporting, time limits, and ongoing coordination.
Would this be legal? Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council
has interpreted its responsibilities for international peace and security to include
things never before thought to be encompassed within the meaning of those
terms. On occasion the Security Council has, acting on its own authority under
Chapter VII, taken temporary charge of state administration, including police,
prisons, and judicial institutions, organized and conducted elections, assisted in
the writing of constitutions and in general overseeing the reshaping of political
life and law. It has, in short, acted in these situations as a kind of international
legislature, in the process taking on new powers to meet urgent humanitarian
requirements where there was no other solution at hand. In addition, recent
Council resolutions on terrorism (1373) and WMDs (1540) impose on all states
obligations to take specific actions to confront these problems, via legislation,
law enforcement and prosecution. Although some critics have warned that a
continuation of this legislative trend could erode state sovereignty, it is currently
the case that decisions of the Council under Chapter VII stand as law.
Checks and balances are crucial to the success and justice of any system
of governance. In the Security Council, the principal checks are the super-
majority requirement for substantive decisions, the veto power of the five
permanent members, and the fact that the non-permanent members turn over so
13. This paper does not advocate giving regional organizations authority to deal with every kind of
threat to peace and security. In the case of a state that is developing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons,
responsibility must remain with the Security Council.
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frequently that the General Assembly could possibly reverse a prior decision of
the Council by electing enough new non-permanent members who oppose the
decision, assuming no veto of the override by a permanent member. Given
these checks, this paper endorses the view that the need to fill the gap in inter-
national responsibility to protect human life outweighs the risk of abuse of
power in cases of mass killing.
The "Responsibility to Protect" Commission recommends that in cases
where no regional agency has acted and the Security Council has failed to deal
with a situation of mass killing, the General Assembly's "Uniting for Peace"
procedure should be invoked.
In granting a carefully delimited general advance authorization to regional
agencies to intervene to halt or prevent mass killing, the Security Council would
retain authority to overrule a regional decision to intervene and could even
demand withdrawal of an intervening force or its replacement by another force.
VI. TERRORISTS AND PRE-EMPTIVE INTERVENTION
U.S. officials have argued, before and after the Iraq intervention, that the
apocalyptic power of WMDs, combined with the growth of anti-Western
terrorist organizations, justifies and even requires governments to act pre-
emptively to defend the lives and fundamental rights of their people.
Except for a subway attack with poison gas in Japan, terrorists have not yet
employed WMDs, but they have tried to obtain the weapons themselves and
their key components from certain states and criminal networks. 4 That a group
might succeed in acquiring such a weapon was put forward as justification for
unilateral pre-emption against a prospective supplier state. It was argued that
Saddam Hussein might use WMDs to attack the U.S. (although there was no
evidence that he had the required delivery capability), or his neighbors (since
he had done so before), and that he would have incentive to hand over WMDs
to terrorists.15 It was thought that he could, for instance, supply terrorists with
enough nuclear material to wrap around a conventional explosive to make a
"dirty bomb" and kill thousands via radiation. The absence of evidence at the
time of any meaningful Iraqi links with Al-Qaeda was glossed over, apparently
on the assumption that the two could not possibly pass up a chance to
collaborate. The U.S. concluded that something must be done, that the Security
Council was hamstrung, and that once the U.S. had taken charge of Iraq, the
14. AI-Qaeda used four airliners as flying bombs to kill thousands of people in the United States,
and they carried out earlier attacks with conventional weapons on the World Trade Center, U.S. embassies
and the U.S.S. Cole, and have continued to strike in different parts of the world since September 11, 2001.
For instance, they have attacked in parts of Indonesia, Spain, and Saudi Arabia.
15. See e.g., H.J. Res. 14, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of the United States Armed Forces
Against Iraq, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (The Bush Administration's request for authorization to use force in Iraq).
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proof of Iraqi WMD programs and Al-Qaeda ties would come to light. The
subsequent public record shows quite clearly that these conclusions were based
on extremely faulty intelligence collection and analysis, but even had they been
accurate there would remain the question of whether military intervention would
be justified.
For purposes of analytical clarity it is useful to look at how one can
confront terrorist organizations as distinct from states. Terrorist organizations
are groups of volunteers, analogous to crime syndicates, not to states. A state
is not a voluntary organization; all kinds of people, most of whom have nothing
to do with terrorists, live within its borders under a common authority and go
about their lives in all kinds of normal ways. The population may include
terrorists (every terrorist group is located within some state) but it is vital to
remember that they are not identifiable with the state or with the general
population. In almost every state, the authorities look upon terrorist groups as
problems to be solved. 6
Conventional military operations (tanks, artillery, bombers, large infantry
units) are generally less effective in disrupting terrorist organizations than other
means. On its own territory, a country first needs to strengthen its domestic
intelligence, investigative and law enforcement capabilities, including especially
control of its borders. Second, it needs to cooperate with as many others as
possible in the same ways, including information-sharing and joint operations.
None of this involves unilateral pre-emptive intervention or raises legality
issues, because states are free to deal with each other on such matters, as for
instance in the ongoing U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-Philippines campaigns.
Conventional military intervention to fight terrorists makes sense if a
country is sheltering terrorists who have mounted previous international attacks,
because one must first defeat the sheltering state's armed forces in order to get
at the terrorists (as in Taliban Afghanistan). The main question becomes
whether intervention can be unilateral or must be multilateral. As the Afghan
case was one of self-defense by the U.S. against the manifest danger of renewed
attacks by Al-Qaeda operating under Taliban protection, unilateral intervention
was justified; the Security Council agreed. Pre-emption arose only in the sense
that there was a moral certainty of new attacks from the same source, and that
these attacks must be pre-empted by disrupting the organization. If there had
been no previous attack, but there was well-corroborated, clear and convincing
evidence that a group was preparing an imminent attack, pre-emption would
also be justified -preferably with multilateral authorization, but unilaterally if
time constraints so required. Note that whether or not the terrorists possessed
WMDs was irrelevant in the actual Afghan case and would be irrelevant in the
hypothetical case just described.
16. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a notable exception.
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Coalitions of the willing formed for pre-emptive purposes, as in the
U.S./U.K. coalition that invaded Iraq, are equivalent to unilateral pre-emption
and need to meet the same criteria for justification. While a coalition provides
a framework for interchange of perspectives and rational deliberation between
analysts and leaders of two or more states and is therefore more likely than a
single state to base its actions on established facts and agreed analyses, coali-
tions are not officers of the law unless authorized to act as such. Unauthorized
unilateral or coalitional pre-emption tends to undermine the network of laws
that states have imposed on themselves to regulate their interactions, and to
undermine respect for law itself. Coalitional intervention, whether reactive or
pre-emptive, must be limited to rare cases of extreme emergency when no other
solution is available, as outlined elsewhere in this essay.
It is also important to note that any force combating terrorism must make
every effort to maintain respect for internationally-recognized basic human
rights, above all those that are non-negotiable even in situations of national
emergency (Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights). In the 1970s and early 1980s, some governments confronting critical
situations tried to control terrorists by sweeping aside respect for all human
rights standards and killing and torturing suspects at will, claiming that terrorist
violence justified any and all methods to defeat them. But when terror becomes
state policy, a government loses legitimacy, and it can also lose focus, as some
of the regimes just described soon failed to distinguish between terrorists and
nonviolent political opponents.
VII. STATES AND WMDs
A state has many channels of ongoing contact and communication with
another state, legal, political, diplomatic, economic, social, technological,
official and private, bilateral and multilateral. They are all channels of influence
through which states deal with each other, and they do not exist in the relation-
ship between a state and a terrorist organization. These channels do not exclude
the reality of power; rather, they presuppose, discipline and channel it. They do
not exclude the possibility of military intervention.
Every rational government takes measures to defend its people, and those
of its allies, from external attack. Governments discharge this task through a
defense establishment, diplomatic and intelligence services, border controls and
alliances. Professionals must tell policymakers frankly what they know for sure
about a particular threat and what they don't know, how certain they are as to
what it means, and why they reach the conclusions they do. But it is policy-
makers who have to decide what to do about it, and when to wait for more infor-
mation before deciding on a course of action, understanding that it is never
possible to know everything about a developing situation and that time for
decision can be very short. 7
Regarding imminence, it is widely accepted that a state has a right, as a
logical extension of self-defense, to use military force to defend itself against
an imminent attack. Classically, this has meant that the pre-empting state had
abundant, well-substantiated, clear and convincing information that a neighbor
whose forces were massed along the border had gone into final preparation for
immediate attack; tanks and infantry were in position to move, warships
entering territorial waters were in battle formation, planes were in the air and
headed in your direction." During the 2002 U.S. Congressional debate on
whether to authorize the use of military force against Iraq, proposals were
introduced to restrict the President's authority. The Administration and its
supporters replied that in today's world, technology has made traditional notions
of imminence obsolete, and that an attack with a WMD would most likely take
place without warning.'9
Admittedly, there are difficulties with imminence as a criterion. On an
individual level, there are situations in which it is unmistakable that an armed
individual is about to attack another with lethal intent. Police officers and crime
victims face these situations frequently, and there are times when it would be
irrational not to shoot first to save one's own life or the life of another
immediately threatened person. In state-to-state situations, one needs solid facts
about intentions, capabilities and actions in progress. There is the danger that
the doctrine of pre-emption in the face of imminent attack can be stretched to
a point where it blends seamlessly into a strategic doctrine of preventive war:
"strike first as soon as possible and gain the advantage of surprise and the
momentum of offense, because sooner or later they will probably make war on
us anyway." This thinking characterized both pre-war strategic planning and
the last-minute crisis phase of the outbreak of the First World War.20
17. In Iraq's case, time was not this limited, as onsite inspections were producing valuable
information, onsite monitoring equipment was being repaired or installed, and conventional missiles were
being destroyed when the decision was made to invade.
18. In American diplomatic history, the classic formulation of criteria for imminence is by Secretary
of State Daniel Webster protesting a British attack on the Caroline, which was carrying a cargo of arms toward
Canada. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1920, 1634-35 (1984).
Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix, UN Secretary
Council 7 March 2003, www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm. Also daily UNMOVIC IAEA Press
Statements on Inspection Activities in Iraq, March 10-17, 2003, UN News Service,
www.un.org/apps/news/printinfocusnews.
19. This rested on the claim that Iraq was working hand in glove with Al-Qaeda and similar groups,
who would carry out the attack through their yet undetected agents in the U.S.
20. In the planning phase, both France and Germany had decided well before 1914 that war between
them was sufficiently probable that, in light of modem developments in weaponry, transportation and
communications, it would be crucial to strike with full force as rapidly as possible once hostilities began.
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During the Cold War, for both NATO and the Soviet Union attack was
always "imminent" in the sense that both sides were ready and able to mount an
attack with just a few minutes notice; hostility and capability were givens, and
the only questions were about short-term intent and the meaning of specific
moves by the other side. World War III did not break out because both sides
developed formal structures of round-the-clock communication, and a code of
conduct that ensured that any given action by one side was explained to the
other in a way that the intent and meaning were clear. During this period, when
everyone lived with the knowledge that modem weaponry and means of
delivery could destroy nations in an hour, a structure of communication and a
code of conduct promoted transparency and helped to manage the problem.
Fear that a state might use a WMD against another country is still focused
mainly on nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, despite the fact that
chemical weapons have been used in recent decades as well as in World War I.
Biological and chemical weapons are thought to be difficult to use in interstate
war, in that they are so unstable that in certain conditions they are as likely to
kill those who use them as their intended victims. Also, most states do not
regard acquiring chemical or biological weapons as a prestigious accomplish-
ment. On the other hand, some states suspected of clandestine nuclear weapons
programs already have or are on the way to obtaining transcontinental delivery
capabilities, and there is also rapidly growing recognition of the difficulty of
preventing the smuggling of a "dirty bomb."
Nuclear weapons are produced by states. IAEA Director General
Mohammed El-Baradei told that organization's General Conference in
September 2004 that the agency has reason to believe that some forty states
have or are on the way to developing the means to produce weapons-grade
nuclear material or actual weapons, and that this means that substantial im-
provement is needed in existing international controls on nuclear proliferation.
He pointed out that slippage in the nonproliferation regime has undeniably
occurred since the end of the Cold War, and that strengthening it is one of the
most urgent tasks of the international community.2 As noted above, possession
of missiles by a state that is found to be developing or has developed a nuclear
weapon further complicates the problem.
In most and perhaps all countries the facilities that produce, use, and store
nuclear material are under government control. It is good security procedures
They thereupon began to train, equip and position their forces to carry out this strategy. In the last-minute
crisis, multiple mobilizations on the continent persuaded all major powers that attack was imminent; it was
only misperception and fear caused the false perception to become real.
21. Id. (discussing several gaps in the existing system, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of
recent efforts to close them, and recommending new multilateral legal initiatives and institutional controls,
accompanied by a shift in aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy).
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that will prevent the theft of this material, good police work that will investigate
any theft, good intelligence, and international cooperation that will halt its
transport across borders.
If a terrorist organization is found to have acquired a nuclear weapon or the
components of a nuclear weapon, the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII, or the General Assembly acting under Uniting for Peace, should regard this
fact as an imminent threat to international peace and security and take
immediate action to neutralize the threat, including military action if necessary,
with or without the cooperation of the state where the terrorists and the weapons
are located. If neither the Council nor the Assembly is able to act in a timely or
effective way, a state that has suffered previous attacks by the same terrorist
organization would have the right in self-defense to seize or destroy the nuclear
weapon(s) or components. Terrorists acquisition of biological or chemical
warfare agents demands appropriate and immediate Security Council action
under Chapter VII, with General Assembly action under Uniting for Peace as
an alternative in case the Council is unable to act promptly or with effect. The
Council must also take appropriate measures against any state that is found to
have supplied a WMD to a terrorists group.
The quality of intelligence supporting the conclusion that terrorists have
acquired nuclear weapons or other WMDs is a key determinant of whether pre-
emptive action is warranted. Mere suspicion is not enough, as all have seen in
the case of Iraq. As has been said elsewhere in this essay, the evidence must be
abundant, well-corroborated, clear and convincing. This requires multiple
reliable sources and as wide a circle of cross-checking and joint assessment
among national services as is consistent with security requirements for intelli-
gence sources and methods.
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